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Abstract
We define and analyze the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium for nonatomic aggregative games
with an infinity of players types. These equilibria are characterized through an infinite-dimensional varia-
tional inequality. We show, under monotonicity conditions, a convergence theorem enables to approximate
such an equilibrium with arbitrary precision. To this end, we introduce a sequence of nonatomic games
with a finite number of players types, which approximates the initial game. We show the existence of
a symmetric Wardrop equilibrium in each of these games. We prove that those symmetric equilibria
converge to an equilibrium of the infinite game, and that they can be computed as solutions of finite-
dimensional variational inequalities. The model is illustrated through an example from smart grids: the
description of a large population of electricity consumers by a parametric distribution gives a nonatomic
game with an infinity of different players types, with actions subject to coupling constraints.
Keywords: nonatomic aggregative game; coupling aggregative constraints; generalized variational
inequality; monotone game; variational equilibrium
1. Introduction
We study the existence and uniqueness of variational Wardrop equilibrium (VWE) in nonatomic
aggregative games with coupling aggregative constraints, where a continuum of players have heterogeneous
compact convex pure-action sets and cost functions. We establish the convergence, to the VWE of such
a game, of a sequence of symmetric VWE in auxiliary games with a finite number of types of players.
A motivating example. Consider the example of an energy operator studying the flexibility potential
between peak and off-peak periods in a large population of energy consumers, for instance all households
in France.
The operator considers that each household i has a certain quantity of energy Ei that can be balanced
between consumption on peak period xP,i and consumption on off-peak periods xO,i, such that xO,i +
xP,i = Ei, depending on the cost (per unit of energy) cP (XP ) and cO(XO) associated with the peak and
off peak periods. The total on-peak consumption XP =
∑
i xP,i and off-peak consumption XO =
∑
i xO,i
affect the prices on the energy market and, therefore, change the costs cP (XP ) and cO(XO) set by the
operator.
The operator wants to compute an equilibrium of this game (for instance to design tariffs). For
practical and privacy reasons, it is impossible to have access to the flexibility potential Ei of the thirty
millions of French households. However, the operator may have an easier access to a precise parametric,
continuous distribution function of the flexibility potential among the French households.
Then, using the inverse transform sampling method, the game is replicated by modeling the population
of households as a continuum Θ = [0, 1] and associating to each θ ∈ Θ the flexible energy quantities Eθ =
F−1E (θ) from the inverse of the cumulative distribution function FE . As the distribution is continuous,
there is an infinity of different energy quantity Eθ i.e. an infinity of players types in the obtained game,
where a type refers to the definition of a set of feasible actions and a payoff function. The operator has
two questions: how to characterize an equilibrium of this nonatomic game with an infinity of players
types and how to compute such an equilibrium. This paper provides answers to those two questions.
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The game described above belongs to the class of aggregative games. In such a game, a player’s
payoff is determined by her own action and the aggregate of all the players’ actions [11]. The setting
of aggregative games is particularly relevant to the study of nonatomic games [37], i.e. games with a
continuum of players. There, a player has an interaction with the other players only via an aggregate-level
profile of their actions, while she has no interest or no way to know the behavior of any particular player
or the identity of the player making a certain choice.
Nonatomic games are readily adapted to many situations in industrial engineering or public sectors
where a huge number of users, such as traffic commuters and electricity consumers, are involved. These
users have no direct interaction except through the aggregate congestion or consumption to which they
are contributing collectively. These situations can often be modeled as a congestion game, a special
class of aggregative games, both in nonatomic version and finite-player version. The latter, called atomic
congestion game, was formally formulated by Rosenthal in 1973 [34], while related research work in
transportation and traffic analysis, mostly in the nonatomic version, appeared much earlier [43, 8]. The
theory of congestion games has also found numerous applications in telecommunications [31], distributed
computing [2], energy management [3], and so on.
Nonatomic games are mathematical tools adapted to the modeling of interactions between a very large
number of agents. Practical cases exist where a nonatomic model is intuitive and straightforward as when
the modeler has an easier access to a description of the population through a parametric distribution of
the types, as illustrated in the example.
As many distributions used in practice (e.g. normal distribution) are continuous, this implies that
the nonatomic game obtained using these distributions will have an infinite number of players’ types.
The concept of equilibrium in nonatomic games is captured by the so called Wardrop equilibrium
(WE) [43]. A nonatomic player neglects the impact of her deviation on the aggregate profile of the whole
population’s actions, in contrast to a finite player.
For the computation of WE, existing results are limited to particular classes of nonatomic games,
such as population games [29, 22, 36], where only a finite number of types of players are considered, each
type sharing the same finite number of pure actions and the same payoff function.
The objective of this paper is to provide a model of nonatomic aggregative games with infinitely many
compact convex pure-action sets and infinitely many payoff functions—in general a specific action set and a
specific payoff function for each nonatomic player— then introduce a general form of coupling aggregative
constraints into these games, define an appropriate notion of equilibrium, study the properties such as
existence and uniqueness of these equilibria and, finally, their computation through an approximation.
Main results. After defining a pure-action profile in a nonatomic game where players have specific com-
pact convex pure-action sets lying in RT , and specific cost functions, convex in their own action variable,
Theorem 2.1 characterizes a WE as a solution to an infinite-dimensional variational inequality (IDVI).
Using the IDVI formulation, we extend this equilibrium notion to the case of a game with coupling
aggregative constraints, by defining variational Wardrop equilibrium (VWE). Theorem 2.3 proves the
existence of WE and VWE in monotone nonatomic games by showing the existence of solutions to the
characteristic IDVI.
In Theorem 2.4, we establish the uniqueness of WE and VWE in case of strictly monotone or aggrega-
tively strictly monotone games. The definition of monotone games is an extension of the stable games
[21], also called dissipative games [40], in population games with a finite types of nonatomic players to
the case with infinitely many types.
In the case where the nonatomic aggregative game has only a finite number of types of players, we
define the notion of symmetric action profiles and symmetric VWE (SVWE), describing situations where
all players of the same type play the same action. Proposition 2.2 shows that SVWEs are characterized as
solutions of a finite-dimensional VI. Besides, Proposition 2.3 shows that, under monotonicity assumptions,
there always exists an SVWE.
Theorem 3.1 is the main result of this paper. It shows that, for a sequence of finite-type approximating
games, if the finite number of pure-action sets and cost functions converge to those of the players of a
monotone nonatomic aggregative game, and if the aggregative constraint converges to the aggregative
constraint of the infinite nonatomic game, then any sequence of SVWE associated to the sequence of
approximating games converges in pure-action profile or in aggregate action profile to the VWE of the
infinite-type game. We provide an upper bound on the distance between the approximating SVWE and
the VWE, specified as a function of the parameters of the approximating finite-type games and the initial
infinite nonatomic game.
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This result allows the construction of a sequence of finite-type approximating games and associated
SVWEs so as to approximate the infinite-dimensional VWE in the special class of strongly or aggrega-
tively strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative games, with or without aggregative constraints. Since
the resolution of finite-dimensional variational inequalities—characterizing SVWEs—is computationally
tractable [14], it follows from our results that a VWE of a nonatomic game with infinitely many types
can be approximated with arbitrary precision.
Section 3.3 shows how to construct an finite-type approximating games sequence for two general
classes of nonatomic games. Appendix A gives the main ideas to extend all our results to the case where
players have nonsmooth subdifferentiable cost functions: to get easily to the key ideas, we focus on the
smooth case in the body of the paper. Appendix B explains how we can use the same arguments to show
the convergence Nash equilibria of atomic finite-player games (instead of nonatomic finite-type games)
to a VWE of a nonatomic game.
Related work. Extensive research has been conducted on WE in nonatomic congestion games via their
formulation with variational inequalities [26]. In addition to their existence and uniqueness, the compu-
tational and dynamical aspects of equilibria as solutions to variational inequalities have also been studied
[38, 46, 44, 10]. However, in most cases, the variational inequalities involved have finite dimensions,
as opposed to the case of WE in this paper. Marcotte and Zhu [27] consider nonatomic players with
continuous types (leading to a characterization of the WE as an IDVI) and studied the equilibrium in an
aggregative game with nonatomic players differentiated through a linear parameter in their cost function.
Convergence of some dynamical systems describing the evolution of pure-action distribution in the
population of a non atomic game has been established for some particular equilibria in some particular
classes such as linear games [41], potential games [8, 35] and stable games [39, 21]. Algorithms corre-
sponding to discretized versions of such dynamical systems for the computation of WE have been studied,
in particular for congestion games [15, 44].
In engineering applications of nonatomic games such as the management of traffic flow or energy con-
sumption, individual commuters or consumers often have specific choice sets due to individual constraints,
and specific payoff functions due to personal preferences. Also, unlike for a transportation user who usu-
ally chooses a single path, an electricity consumer as modeled in the example above faces a resource
allocation problem where she has to split the consumption of a certain quantity of energy over different
time periods. Hence, her pure-action set is no longer a finite, discrete set as a commuter but a compact
convex set in RT where T is the total number of time periods. Few results exist for the computation of
pure-action WE in the case where players have continuous action sets and in the case where there are
infinitely many different types (i.e. action sets and payoff functions) of players. For example, [37] shows
the existence of equilibrium in nonatomic games with finite action sets. Mas-Colell [28] and Carmona
and Podzeck [9] consider compact strategy sets and show the existence of mixed strategy equilibria, and
do not consider the case of aggregative games and pure-strategy equilibria. In their model, all players
share the same actions set. Besides, most of the existing work assumes smooth cost functions of players
which is somewhat restrictive in applications, as for instance electricity tariffs or tolls are usually not
continuous.
Similarly, the subject of nonatomic games with (aggregative) coupling constraints has only been
partially addressed. Coupling constraints at an aggregative level are to be considered in many of the
above-mentioned applications, as also mentioned in [16]: for instance, when modeling the electricity
consumption (see above example), some capacity constraints of the network or ramping constraints on
the variation of total energy consumption between time periods are natural to consider from an engineering
point of view. As seen in this paper, the presence of coupling constraints is not a simple artifact, as it adds
non trivial difficulties in the analysis of WE and their computation. Indeed, an appropriate definition
of equilibrium is already not obvious. An analog to the so-called generalized Nash equilibrium [18] for
finite-player games does not exist for nonatomic games because a nonatomic player’s behavior has no
impact on the aggregative profile. Moreover, dynamical systems and algorithms used to compute WE
in population games cannot be straightforwardly extended to this case. Indeed, in these dynamics and
algorithms, players adapt their strategies unilaterally in their respective strategy spaces, which can well
lead to a new strategy profile violating the coupling constraint.
Several works have quantified the relationship between Nash and Wardrop equilibria, a subject close
to this paper, as shown in Appendix B. Haurie and Marcotte [20] show that in a sequence of atomic
splittable games where atomic splittable players are replaced by smaller and smaller equal-size players
with constant total weight, Nash equilibria converge to the WE of a nonatomic game. Their proof is
based on the convergence of variational inequalities corresponding to the sequence of Nash equilibria,
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a technique similar to the one used in this paper. Wan [42] generalizes this result to composite games
where nonatomic players and atomic splittable players coexist, by allowing the atomic players to replace
themselves by players with heterogeneous sizes.
Gentile et al. [32] consider a specific class of finite-player aggregative games with linear coupling
constraints. They use the variational inequality formulations for the unique generalized Nash equilibrium
and the unique generalized Wardrop-type equilibrium (which consists in letting each finite player act as
if she was nonatomic) of the same finite-player game to show that, when the number of players grows, the
former can be approximated by the latter. Their results are different from ours, as we consider nonatomic
games with players of infinitely-many different types instead of finite-player games. Consequently, we
consider VWE and symmetric VWE instead of generalized equilibria, which do not exist in nonatomic
games. In contrast to generalized equilibria, a variational equilibrium is not characterized by a best reply
condition for each of the finite or nonatomic players, as shown in Section 3. We also consider a general
form of coupling constraints, and extend our results to nonsmooth cost functions, as shown in Appendix
A (we focus on the differentiable case in the body of the paper).
Milchtaich [30] studies finite and nonatomic crowding games (similar to nonatomic aggregative games),
where players have finitely many pure actions, and shows that, if each player in an n-person game is
replaced by m identical replicas with constant total weight, pure Nash equilibria generically converge to
the unique equilibrium of the limit nonatomic game as m goes to infinity. His proof is not based on a
variational inequality formulation.
Structure. The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the definitions of
nonatomic aggregative games with and without aggregative constraints. After defining WE and VWE
equilibrium in the case of an infinite number of players’ types, we show, under monotonicity assump-
tions, the existence and uniqueness of equilibria there via generalized IDVIs. In the case of finite-type
games, we define the notions of symmetric profiles and SVWE and show their characterization through
finite-dimensional VIs and their existence. In Section 3, we give the definition of a sequence of finite-
type approximating games for a nonatomic aggregative game with or without coupling constraints, and
present the main theorem of the paper on the convergence of the sequence of S(V)WE, associated to
the sequence of finite-type approximating games, to the (V)WE of the nonatomic game. In Section 3.3,
the construction of sequences of finite-type approximating games is shown for two important classes of
nonatomic aggregative games. In Section 4, we step back to the flexible energy example given above, and
derive our results to the computation of an SVWE in this framework.
Last, in Appendix A, we show how our results extend to the case of nonsmooth cost functions and
in Appendix B, we show how the results can be adapted to prove the convergence of Nash equilibria to
a VWE of a nonatomic game.
Notation. Vectors are denoted by a bold font (e.g. x) as opposed to scalars (e.g. x).
The transpose of vector x is denoted by xτ .
The closed ball in a metric space, centered at x and of radius η, is denoted by Bη(x).
For a nonempty convex set C in a Hilbert space H (over R),
• TC(x) = {y ∈ H : y = 0 or ∃(xk)k in C s.t. xk 6≡ x,xk → x, xk−x‖xk−x‖ →
y
‖y‖} is the tangent cone
of C at x ∈ C;
• span C = {∑ki=1 αixi : k ∈ N, αi ∈ R,xi ∈ C} is the linear span of C;
• aff C = {∑ki=1 αixi : k ∈ N, αi ∈ R,∑i αi = 1,xi ∈ C} is the affine hull of C;
• ri C = {x ∈ C : ∃η > 0 s.t. Bη(x) ∩ aff C ⊂ C} is the relative interior of C;
• rbd C is the relative boundary of C in H, i.e. the boundary of C in span C.
The inner product of two points x and y in any Euclidean space RT is denoted by 〈x,y〉 = ∑Ti=1 xiyi.
The l2-norm of x is denoted by ‖x‖ , 〈x,x〉1/2.
We denote by L2([0, 1],RT ) the Hilbert space of measurable functions from [0, 1] (equipped with the
Lebesgue measure µ) to RT that are square integrable with respect to the Lebesgue measure. The inner
product of two vector functions F and G is denoted by 〈F,G〉2 =
∫ 1
0 〈F (θ), G(θ)〉dθ. The Hilbert space
L2([0, 1],RT ) is endowed with L2-norm: ‖F‖2 = 〈F, F 〉1/22 .
The distance between a point x and a set A is denoted by dm(x, A) , infy∈A ‖x− y‖m, where m is
omitted or is equal to 2, depending on whether we consider an Euclidean space or L2([0, 1],RT ).
4
Similarly, the Hausdorff distance between two sets A and B is denoted by dH,m(A,B), which is defined
as max{supx∈A dm(x, B), supy∈B dm(y, A)}.
For a function (x,X) 7→ f(x,X) of two explicit variables, convex in x, we denote by ∇1f(x,X) the
differential of function f(·,X) for any fixed X, except in Appendix A in which ∂ (resp. ∂1) is used to
denote the (resp. partial) subdifferential.
2. Monotonicity, Coupling Constraints and Symmetric Equilibrium
2.1. Nonatomic aggregative games
In nonatomic aggregative games considered here, players have compact pure-action sets, and hetero-
geneous pure-action sets as well as heterogeneous cost function. This model is in line with Schmeidler’s
seminal paper [37]. It differs from most of the population games studied in game theory [22, 36], in which
nonatomic players are grouped into several populations, with players in the same population having the
same finite pure-action set and the same cost function.
Definition 2.1 (Nonatomic aggregative game). A nonatomic aggregative game G is defined by:
i) a continuum of players represented by the points on the real interval Θ = [0, 1] endowed with
Lebesgue measure;
ii) a set of feasible pure actions Xθ ⊂ RT for each player θ ∈ Θ, with T ∈ N∗ a constant;
iii) a cost function Xθ × RT → R : (xθ,X) 7→ fθ(xθ,X) for each player θ, where X = (Xt)Tt=1 and
Xt ,
∫ 1
0 xθ′,t dθ
′ refers to an aggregate-action profile, given action profile (xθ′)θ′∈Θ for the population Θ.
The set of feasible pure-action profiles is defined by:
X , {x ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ) : ∀ θ ∈ Θ,xθ ∈ Xθ} .
Denote the game by G = (Θ,X , (fθ)θ∈Θ).
Remark 2.1. The definition of a nonatomic aggregative game asks the pure-action profile x to be a
measurable and integrable function on Θ instead of simply being a collection of xθ ∈ Xθ for θ ∈ Θ. In
other words, a coupling constraint is inherent in the definition of nonatomic aggregative games and the
notion of WE. This is in contrast with finite-player games.
The set of feasible aggregate actions is X , {X ∈ RT : ∃x ∈ X s.t. ∫ 10 xθ dθ = X}.
Further assumptions are needed for X to be nonempty and for the existence of an equilibrium.
Assumption 1 (Nonatomic pure-action sets). The correspondence X : Θ⇒ RT , θ 7→ Xθ has nonempty,
convex, compact values. Moreover, for all θ ∈ Θ, Xθ ⊂ BR(0), with R > 0 a constant.
Under Assumption 1, a sufficient condition for x to be in L2([0, 1],RT ) is that x is measurable.
Notations. We denote by M = [0, R+ 1]T the hypercube in RT of edge R+ 1.
Assumption 2 (Measurability). The correspondence X : Θ ⇒ RT , θ 7→ Xθ has a measurable graph
GrX = {(θ,xθ) ∈ RT+1 : θ ∈ Θ,xθ ∈ Xθ}, i.e. GrX is a Borel subset of RT+1.
The function GrX → RT : (θ,xθ) 7→ fθ(xθ,Y ) is measurable for each Y ∈ RT .
Assumption 3 (Nonatomic convex cost functions). For all θ, fθ is defined on (M′)2, where M′ is a
neighborhood of M, and:
i) for each θ ∈ Θ, function fθ is continuous. In particular, fθ is bounded on M2;
ii) for each θ ∈ Θ and each aggregate profile Y ∈ M, x 7→ fθ(x,Y ) is differentiable and convex on
M′;
iii) there is Lf > 0 such that ‖∇1fθ(xθ,Y )‖ ≤ Lf for each xθ ∈M, each Y ∈M, and each θ ∈ Θ.
Remark 2.2. Assumption 3.iii) implies that fθ(·, ·)’s are Lipschitz in the first variable with a uniform
Lipschitz constant Lf on M2 for all θ.
We also need the continuity of the derivative of cost functions in the second (aggregate) variable:
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Assumption 4. For each θ ∈ Θ and each xθ ∈M, the function Y 7→ ∇1fθ(xθ,Y ) is continuous on M.
Wardrop equilibrium extends the notion of Nash equilibrium in the framework of nonatomic games,
where a single player of measure zero has a negligible impact on the others.
Definition 2.2 (Wardrop Equilibrium (WE), [43]). A pure-action profile x∗ ∈ X is a pure Wardrop
equilibrium of nonatomic aggregative game G if we have, with X∗ =
∫
θ∈Θ x
∗
θ dθ:
fθ(x∗θ,X∗) ≤ fθ(xθ,X∗), ∀xθ ∈ Xθ, ∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ .
All the actions and equilibria in this paper are pure, hence from now on, we no longer emphasize it.
Before characterizing WE by infinite-dimensional VI (IDVI), let us introduce some notions and a
technical assumption ensuring that the IDVI is well-defined.
Lemma 2.1. For all x ∈ L2([0, 1],M), the function gx defined from Θ to RT by
gx(θ) , ∇1fθ(xθ,
∫
x) , ∀θ ∈ Θ , ∀x ∈ L2([0, 1],M) (1)
is measurable on Θ. Consequently, g· is a mapping from L2([0, 1],M) to L2([0, 1],RT ).
Proof of Lemma 2.1. For n ∈ N large enough, gx,n , θ 7→ n
(
fθ(xθ + 1n ,
∫
x)− fθ(xθ,
∫
x)
)
is well
defined. It is measurable according to Assumption 2. Thus gx = limn gx,n is also measurable as a limit
of measurable functions.
Theorem 2.1 (IDVI formulation of WE). Under Assumptions 1 to 3, x∗ ∈ X is a WE of nonatomic
aggregative game G if and only if either of the following two equivalent conditions is true:
∀ a.e. θ ∈ Θ, 〈∇1fθ(x∗θ,X∗),xθ − x∗θ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀xθ ∈ Xθ , (2a)∫
Θ
〈gx∗(θ),xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0 , ∀x ∈ X . (2b)
Proof of Theorem 2.1. Given X∗, (2a) is a necessary and sufficient condition for x∗θ to minimize the
convex function fθ(.,X∗) on Xθ. Condition (2a) implies condition (2b) because of Lemma 2.1.
For the converse, suppose that x∗ ∈ X satisfies condition (2b) but not (2a). Then there must be a
subset Θ′ of Θ with strictly positive measure such that for each θ ∈ Θ′, x∗θ /∈ Yθ , arg minXθ fθ(·,X∗).
In particular, for any yθ ∈ Yθ, 〈gx∗(θ), yθ − x∗θ〉 < fθ(yθ,X∗) − fθ(x∗θ,X∗) < 0. A consequence of
Assumptions 2 and 3 is that the function Θ×M → R : (θ,z) 7→ fθ(z,X∗) is a Carathe´odory function,
that is, (i) f·(z,X∗) is measurable on Θ for each z ∈ M, and (ii) fθ(·,X∗) is continuous on M for
each θ ∈ Θ. Thus, according to the measurable maximum theorem [1, Thm. 18.19] applied to f·(·,X∗),
there exists a selection yθ ∈ arg minXθ fθ(·,X∗) for θ ∈ Θ′ such that Θ′ → RT : θ 7→ yθ is a measurable
function. By defining yθ = x∗θ for θ /∈ Θ′, one has Θ→ RT : θ 7→ yθ is measurable and hence belongs to
X . However, ∫Θ〈gx∗(θ),yθ − x∗θ〉dθ = ∫Θ′〈gx∗(θ),yθ − x∗θ〉dθ < 0, contradicting (2b).
Remark 2.3. Condition (2a) is equivalent to 〈gx∗(θ),yθ〉 ≥ 0 for all yθ ∈ TXθ (x∗θ) for each θ. It means
that no unilateral deviation is profitable. However, since each nonatomic player has measure zero, when
considering a deviation in the action profile, one must let players in a set of strictly positive measure
deviate: (2b) means that the collective deviation of players of any set of strictly positive measure increases
their cost.
The existence of WE is obtained by an equilibrium existence theorem for nonatomic games.
Theorem 2.2 (Existence of a WE, [33]). Under Assumption 1, Assumption 2 and Assumption 3.i), if
for all θ and all Y ∈ M, fθ(·,Y ) is continuous on M, then the nonatomic aggregative game G admits
a WE.
Proof. The conditions required in Remark 8 in Rath’s 1992 paper [33] on the existence of WE in aggregate
games are satisfied.
Remark 2.4. No convexity of fθ(·,Y )’s are needed for the existence.
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2.2. Monotone Nonatomic Aggregative Games
For the uniqueness of WE and the existence of equilibrium notion to be introduced in the next
subsection for the case with coupling constraints, let us consider the following notions of monotonicity in
nonatomic aggregative games, also sometimes referred to as stability.
Definition 2.3. With notation gx(θ) = ∇1fθ(xθ,
∫
x), for any θ ∈ Θ and any x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M), we
say that the nonatomic aggregative game G is
i) monotone if ∫
Θ
〈gx(θ)− gy(θ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) . (3)
ii) strictly monotone if the equality in (3) holds if and only if x = y almost everywhere.
iii) aggregatively strictly monotone if the equality in (3) holds if and only if
∫
x =
∫
y.
iv) strongly monotone with modulus α if∫
Θ
〈gx(θ)− gy(θ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ α‖x− y‖22, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) . (4)
v) aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β if∫
Θ
〈gx(θ)− gy(θ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ β‖
∫
x− ∫ y‖2, ∀x,y ∈ L2([0, 1],M) . (5)
Remark 2.5. A recent paper of Hadikhanloo [17] generalizes the notion of stable games in population
games [21] to monotone games in anonymous games, an extension of population games with players having
heterogeneous compact action sets but the same payoff function. He defines the notion of monotonicity
directly on the distribution of actions among the players instead of action profile as we do. The two
approaches are compatible.
Example of public products games.. An interesting example of aggregative games are given by cost func-
tions of the form:
fθ(xθ,X) = 〈xθ, c(X)〉 − uθ(xθ) , (6)
where c(X) specifies the per-unit cost (or negative of per-unit utility) of each of the T “public products”,
which is a function of the aggregative contribution X to each of the “public products”. Player θ’s cost
(resp. negative of utility) associated to these products is scaled by her own contribution xθ. The function
uθ(xθ) measures the private utility of player θ (resp. negative of private cost) for the contribution xθ.
For instance, in a public goods game, −ct(Xt) is the common per-unit payoff for using public good t,
determined by the total contribution Xt, while −uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private cost of supplying xθ to the
public goods; in a Cournot competition, −ct(Xt) is the common market price for product t, determined
by its total supply Xt, while −uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private cost of producing xθ,t unit of product t for
each product t; in a congestion game, ct(Xt) is the common per-unit cost for using arc t in a network,
determined by the aggregate load Xt on arc t, while uθ(xθ) is player θ’s private utility of her routing or
energy consuming choice xθ.
Proposition 2.1. Under Assumptions 1 to 3, in a public products game G (i.e. with cost functions of
form (6)), assume that c is monotone on M and, for each θ, uθ is a concave function on M. Then:
i) G is a monotone game.
ii) If uθ is strictly concave on M for all θ ∈ Θ, then G is a strictly monotone game.
iii) If c is strictly monotone on M, then G is an aggregatively strictly monotone game.
iv) If uθ is strongly concave on M with modulus αθ for each θ ∈ Θ and infθ∈Θ αθ = α > 0, then G is a
strongly monotone game with modulus α.
v) If c is strongly monotone on M with β, then G is an aggregatively strongly monotone game with
modulus β.
7
Proof. i) Let x,y ∈ X and X = ∫ x, Y = ∫ y. For each θ, ∇1fθ(xθ,X) = c(X)−∇uθ(xθ). Then, given
x,y ∈ X , we have 〈∇uθ(xθ) − ∇uθ(yθ),xθ − yθ〉 ≤ 0 because uθ is concave. Then
∫ 1
0 〈∇1fθ(xθ,X) −
∇1fθ(yθ,Y ),xθ − yθ〉dθ = 〈c(X)− c(Y ),X − Y 〉 −
∫ 1
0 〈∇uθ(xθ)−∇uθ(yθ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0 because c
is monotone. Hence G is a monotone game.
The proof for ii)-v) is omitted.
In particular, if c(X) = (ct(Xt))t∈T , then c is monotone if ct’s are all non-decreasing, and c is strongly
monotone if ct’s are all strictly increasing.
2.3. Aggregate constraints and VWE
Let us consider the aggregative constraint in nonatomic aggregative game G: X ∈ A, where A
is a convex compact subset of RT such that A ∩ X 6= ∅. Let X (A) be a subset of X defined by
X (A) , {x ∈ X : X = ∫ x ∈ A}. Let us denote the nonatomic aggregative game with aggregative
constraint X ∈ A by G(A).
A notion of generalized WE similar to the one of generalized Nash equilibrium in finitely-many-
player games—where each player does the best she can while not violating the coupling constraints given
the choices of the others [18]—is not well-defined in a nonatomic game. Indeed, since the impact of a
nonatomic player’s choice on the aggregative profile is negligible, the feasible action set of a nonatomic
player θ facing the choices of the others x−θ in a game with coupling constraint is not a well-established
notion: either
∫
x−θ ∈ A then Xθ = X , or
∫
x−θ /∈ A then Xθ = ∅. Departing from an action profile
in X (A), simultaneous unilateral deviations by the players can lead to any profile in X . If only profiles
in X (A) are allowed to be attained, then one lands on a notion similar to the so-called variational
Nash equilibrium in finite-many-player games [18]. Indeed, the most natural notion of equilibrium with
the presence of aggregative constraint is the notion of variational Wardrop equilibrium, where feasible
deviations are defined on a collective basis.
Definition 2.4 (Variational Wardrop Equilibrium (VWE)). A solution to the following IDVI problem:
Find x∗ ∈ X (A) s.t.
∫
Θ
〈gx∗(θ),xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (A), (7)
is called a variational Wardrop equilibrium of G(A).
Remark 2.6 (VWE in the literature). In the literature of congestion games, the equilibrium notion
characterized by VI of form (7) but in finite dimension and with smooth cost functions has long been
studied. For example, see [24, 25, 12, 45] and references therein.
The following facts are needed for later use.
Lemma 2.2. Under Assumptions 1 and 2:
i) X is a nonempty, convex, closed and bounded subset of L2([0, 1],RT );
ii) X (A) is a nonempty, convex and closed subset of X ;
iii) X and A ∩ X are nonempty, convex and compact subsets of RT .
We omit the proof and only point out that X and X are nonempty because of Assumption 1 and the
measurable selection theorem of Aumann [5], while aggregate-action set X is compact by [4, Theorem 4].
Theorem 2.3 shows the existence of VWE via the VI approach.
Theorem 2.3 (Existence of VWE). Under Assumptions 1 to 4, if a nonatomic aggregative game with
coupling constraint G(A) is monotone on X (A), then a VWE exists.
Proof. We can apply [13, Corollary 2.1] which shows that Eq. (7) has a solution, as:
• X (A) is bounded, closed and convex in L2([0, 1],RT );
• g. : L2([0, 1],M) ⇒ L2([0, 1],RT ) is a monotone correspondence which is upper hemicontinuous
from the line segments in X (A) to the weak* topology of L2([0, 1],RT ). Notice that g. has closed values.
Let us do the proof in the general nonsmooth case.
Take x and y in X (A), consider sequence (x(k))k with x(k) ∈ [x,y] with x(k) → x, and sequence
(g(k))k such that g(k) ∈ gx(k) and g(k) ∗⇀ g∞ with g∞ ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ). Let us show that g∞ ∈ gx. We
have X =
∫
x converging to X(k) =
∫
x(k) in l2-norm.
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By definition of g. and convexity, for each z ∈M, for each θ, fθ(zθ,X(k)θ ) ≥ fθ(x(k)θ ,X(k))+〈g(k)θ , zθ−
x
(k)
θ 〉. Since fθ is continuous in both variables, fθ(zθ,X(k))→ fθ(zθ,X) and fθ(x(k)θ ,X(k))→ fθ(xθ,X).
Besides, 〈g(k)θ , zθ − x(k)θ 〉 = 〈g(k)θ , zθ − xθ〉 + 〈g(k)θ ,xθ − x(k)θ 〉, and 〈g(k)θ , zθ − xθ〉 → 〈g∞θ , zθ − xθ〉
because g(k) ∗⇀ g∞, while 〈g(k)θ ,xθ − x(k)θ 〉 → 0 because g(k)θ ’s are uniformly bounded by Lf . Therefore,
fθ(zθ,X) ≥ fθ(x(k)θ ,X)+〈gθ, zθ−xθ〉 so that g∞θ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,X). Since the limit of measurable functions
is measurable, g is measurable. Hence g∞ ∈ gx (and g∞ = gx in the smooth case), which concludes.
Theorem 2.4 (Uniqueness of VWE). Under Assumptions 1 to 3:
i) if G(A) is strictly monotone on X (A), then it has at most one VWE;
ii) if G(A) is aggregatively strictly monotone on X (A), then all VWE of G(A) have the same ag-
gregative profile;
iii) if G (without aggregative constraint) is only aggregatively strictly monotone but, for each θ ∈ Θ
and all Y ∈M, fθ(x,Y ) is strictly convex in x, then there is at most one WE.
Proof. Suppose that x,y ∈ X (A) are both VWE. Let X = ∫ x and Y = ∫ y. According to Theorem
2.1, we have
∫
Θ〈gx(θ),yθ − xθ〉dθ ≥ 0 and
∫
Θ〈gy(θ),xθ − yθ〉dθ ≥ 0. Adding up these two inequalities
yields
∫
Θ〈gx(θ)− gy(θ),yθ − xθ〉dθ ≥ 0.
i) If G(A) is a strictly monotone game, then
∫
Θ〈gx(θ)−gy(θ),xθ−yθ〉dθ = 0 and thus x = y almost
everywhere.
ii)-iii) If G(A) is an aggregatively strictly monotone game, then
∫
Θ〈gx(θ) − gy(θ),xθ − yθ〉dθ = 0
and thus X = Y .
If there is no aggregative constraint and fθ(·,Z) is strictly convex for all Z ∈ M, then for all θ, xθ
(resp. yθ) is the unique minimizer of fθ(·,X) (resp. fθ(·,Y )). Since X = Y , one has xθ = yθ.
2.4. Symmetric VWE with a finite number of types
A particular class of nonatomic aggregative games is those with only a finite number of types of
players, that is, when the sets {Xθ}θ and {fθ}θ are both finite. Consider a nonatomic aggregative game
with a set of I types I = {1, . . . , I}. The player set Θ is divided into I measurable subsets Θ1, . . . ,ΘI
such that each nonatomic player belonging to Θi is of type i. Let us denote the common action set of
players in Θi by Xi and their common cost functions by fi.
Let us consider a particular class of action profiles in these finite-type nonatomic aggregative games,
called symmetric action profiles:
Definition 2.5 (Symmetric action profile and symmetric variational Wardrop equilibrium (SVWE)).
The set of symmetric action profiles, denoted by XS , is the set of action profiles where players of the
same type play the same action:
XS , {x ∈ X : xθ = xξ,∀θ, ξ ∈ Θi,∀i ∈ I}
The set of symmetric action profiles satisfying the aggregative constraint is denoted by
XS(A) , XS ∩X (A) . (8)
A symmetric variational Wardrop equilibrium is a VWE that is symmetric.
For any symmetric action profile x ∈ XS , let the common action of players of type i ∈ I be denoted
by xi, so that the action profile can be specified by (xi)i∈I . Obviously, for x ∈ XS , for each type i ∈ I,
gx(θ) = gx(ξ) = ∇1fi(xi,
∫
x) for all θ, ξ ∈ I. Let us abusively denote this quantity by gx(i).
Proposition 2.2. In a finite-type nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative constraint, a
VWE is a symmetric one if and only if it is a solution to the following VI:
Find xˆ ∈ XS(A) s.t.
∑
i∈I〈gxˆ(i), µixi − µixˆi〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ XS(A) , (9)
where µi is the Lebesgue measure of Θi.
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Proof. Since XS(A) ⊂ X (A), it is clear that a SVWE, characterized as a solution to the IDVI (7), is a
solution to (9).
Conversely, suppose that xˆ is a solution to the VI problem (9), let us show that it also solves the
IDVI (7). Indeed, for all x ∈ X (A),∫
Θ
〈gxˆ(θ),xθ − xˆθ〉dθ =
∑
i∈I
∫
Θi〈gxˆ(θ),xθ − xˆθ〉dθ =
∑
i∈I〈gxˆ(i),
∫
Θi xθ − µixˆi〉
=
∑
i∈I〈gxˆ(i), µi
∫
Θi
xθ
µi
− µixˆi〉 ≥ 0
as for all θ ∈ Θi, xθ ∈ Xi which is convex, hence
∫
Θi
xθ
µi
∈ Xi, so that (9) can be applied.
Proposition 2.3 (Existence of SVWE). Under Assumptions 1, 3 and 4, a finite-type nonatomic ag-
gregative game G(A) admits a SVWE.
Proof. First note that the VI problem (9) is equivalent to a finite dimension VI:
Find xˆ ∈ XS(A)′ s.t.
∑
i∈I〈∇1fi(xˆi,
∑
j∈I µjxˆj), µixi − µixˆi〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ XS(A)′ , (10)
where XS(A)′ is the finite-dimensional set
XS(A)′ , {x ∈ RIT : x ∈
∏
i∈I Xi,
∑
i∈I µixi ∈ A} .
As the mapping (xi)i∈I 7→
(∇1fi(xi,∑j µjxˆj))i∈I is continuous from Assumption 4, then [19, Lemma
3.1] implies that the VI (10) has a solution on the finite dimensional convex compact XS(A)′.
In this paper, only SVWE are considered for finite-type nonatomic aggregative games. For such
equilibria, the distribution of different types on Θ is not relevant, since the equilibrium behavior of each
player is only determined by the finite dimensional VI (10). Therefore, we shall specify a finite-type
nonatomic aggregative game only by the tuple
(
(µi)i∈I , (Xi)i∈I , (fi)i∈I , A
)
. In particular, a symmetric
action profile in such a game shall be specified by a vector (xi)i∈I ∈ RIT , and the set of symmetric action
profiles is nothing else but XS(A)′.
3. Approximating an Infinite-type nonatomic aggregative game
3.1. Finite-type approximating game sequence
After introducing (V)WE in nonatomic aggregative games and SVWE in finite-type nonatomic ag-
gregative games with coupling constraints, we study the relation between these notions. As WE is a
particular case of VWE when the aggregate constraint set is any subset of RT containing X , we can only
consider the case of VWE and SVWE.
This section shows the following result: considering a sequence of equilibria of “approximating” finite-
type nonatomic aggregative games (Gν(Aν))ν of a nonatomic aggregative game G(A), where each type
of players in Gν(Aν) corresponds to a collection of nonatomic players who are similar in their types, a
sequence of SVWE in (Gν(Aν))ν converges to the VWE of G(A) when this one is (aggregatively) strongly
monotone.
The particularity of SVWE is that it can be characterized by a finite dimensional VI. As opposed
to the case of infinite dimensional ones, there is a large literature on algorithms for computing solutions
of finite dimensional VI (e.g. [14] and references therein). Therefore, the result stated above can be
practically used to compute a VWE, solution of an IDVI, with arbitrary precision.
In this section, we always suppose that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold.
Let us consider the following definition of an approximating game sequence:
Definition 3.1. Finite-type Approximating Games Sequence
A sequence of finite-type nonatomic aggregative games {Gν(Aν) = ((µνi )i∈Iν , (X νi )i∈Iν , (fνi )i∈Iν , Aν) :
ν ∈ N∗} with aggregative constraints is a finite-type approximating game sequence for the nonatomic
aggregative game G(A) =
(
Θ,X , (fθ)θ, A
)
with an aggregative constraint if, for each ν ∈ N∗, there exists
a partition (Θν0 ,Θν1 , . . . ,ΘνIν ) of the set Θ, with Iν , {1, . . . , Iν}, such that the Lebesgue measure of Θν0
is µν0 = 0, and if, for each i ∈ Iν , the Lebesgue measure of Θνi is µνi while the collection of nonatomic
players in Θνi are getting close to the nonatomic players of type i ∈ Iν in the sense that, as ν → +∞:
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i) δν , maxi∈Iν δνi −→ 0, where δνi is the Hausdorff distance between the action sets of nonatomic
players in Θνi in G(A) and the action set of nonatomic players of type i ∈ Iν in Gν(Aν):
δνi , sup
θ∈Θν
i
dH (Xθ,X νi ) , (11)
and span X νi = span Xθ, ∀θ ∈ Θνi .
ii) dν , maxi∈Iν dνi −→ 0, where dνi measures the distance between the differential of nonatomic players’
cost functions in G(A) and that of their corresponding players’ cost functions in Gν(Aν):
dνi , sup
θ∈Θi
sup
(x,Y )∈M2
‖∇1fνi (xi,Y )−∇1fθ(xθ,Y )‖ . (12)
iii) Dν −→ 0, where Dν , dH (Aν , A) is the Hausdorff distance between the aggregative constraint set
Aν ⊂ RT and the aggregative constraint set A ⊂ RT . Besides, span A = span Aν for all ν ∈ N∗.
Roughly speaking, along a sequence of finite-type approximating games, for each nonatomic player θ
in Θ, the difference between her type and her corresponding type i in the approximating game Gν(A) (in
the sense that θ ∈ Θνi ) is disappearing as ν goes to infinity. Also, the aggregate-profile constraint sets of
the sequence of approximating games converge to the one in G(A).
Note that, except the last condition on Dν , the other conditions are independent of the constraint
sets (Aν)ν and A.
Remark 3.1. The assumption span X νi = span Xθ, ∀θ ∈ Θνi is needed for our proofs because of the
existence of coupling constraints. It implies in particular that the nonatomic infinite game considered is
such that {span Xθ}θ∈Θ has a finite number of elements. This assumption is natural as, in many models,
span Xθ will be the same for all θ ∈ Θ (see example of Section 4).
Remark 3.2. Without loss of generality, we assume ri (A ∩ X ) 6= ∅ in this section. Indeed, if the
nonempty convex compact set A ∩ X has an empty relative interior, then it is reduced to a point hence
the problem becomes trivial.
In Section 3.3, we will construct a sequence of finite-type approximating games for two fairly general
cases of nonatomic aggregative games.
In order to compare symmetric action profiles in the approximating games and action profiles in the
original game, we introduce the following linear mappings which define an equivalent action profile for a
symmetric action profile in an approximating game, and vice versa.
First, define the set LIνS , {x ∈ L2([0, 1],M) : xθ = xξ,∀θ, ξ ∈ Θi,∀i ∈ Iν} and the mapping
ψν : L2([0, 1],M)→ LIνS for each ν ∈ N∗ by
∀x ∈ L2([0, 1],MT ), ψν(x) = (ψνθ (x))θ∈Θ, where ∀i ∈ Iν , ∀θ ∈ Θνi , ψνθ (x) =
∫
Θν
i
xξdξ
µν
i
. (13)
The interpretation of ψν is that a nonatomic player θ ∈ Θi (type i) adopts the average behavior of players
in Θνi .
In the following, we assume that Assumptions 1, 3 and 4 also hold for each game Gν of a sequence of
finite-type approximating games: this appears naturally in many cases if (Gν)ν is built from G, as seen
in Section 3.3. Finally, let us make the following additional assumption for this section.
Assumption 5. There is a strictly positive constant η and an action profile x¯ ∈ X such that, for almost
all θ ∈ Θ, d(x¯θ, rbd Xθ) > η.
It means that the action space of each player has an (aggregatively) nonempty relative interior and
that the relative interior is not vanishing along any sequence of players.
3.2. Convergence of equilibrium profiles and aggregate equilibrium profiles
The following Theorem 3.1 gives the main result of this paper. It shows that a VWE in a strongly
monotone nonatomic aggregative game can be approximated by SVWE of a finite-type approximating
games sequence, both in the case with and without aggregative constraints.
Recall that, according to Theorem 2.4, a strongly monotone game is strictly monotone, hence the VWE
is unique, while an aggregatively strongly monotone game is aggregatively strictly monotone, hence the
aggregate-action profile at VWE is unique.
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Theorem 3.1 (Convergence of SVWE to VWE). Under Assumptions 1 to 5, let (Gν(Aν))ν be a se-
quence of finite-type approximating games for the nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative
constraint A. Let x∗ be the VWE of G(A), xˆν ∈ X ν(Aν) an SVWE of Gν(Aν) for each ν ∈ N∗, and X∗,
Xˆν their respective aggregate-action profiles. Then, there exists a constant ρ > 0 such that the following
results hold with KA , R+1ρ :
i) If G is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β, (Xˆν)ν converges to X∗: for all ν ∈ N∗
such that max(δν , Dν) < ρ,
‖Xˆν −X∗‖2 ≤ 1
β
(
(4Lf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)dν
)
. (14)
ii) If G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then (xˆν)ν , converges to x∗ in L2-norm: for all ν ∈ N∗
such that max(δν , Dν) < ρ,
‖xˆ− x∗‖22 ≤
1
α
(
(4Lf + 1)KA max(Dν , δ
ν) + (2M + 1)dν
)
. (15)
If there are no aggregate constraints, one can replace KA (resp. Dν) by 12 (resp. 0) in (14) and (15),
and Assumption 5 is no longer required.
Some notions and a series of lemmas are needed for the proof of Theorem 3.1.
Notations. Let Πνi (·) denote the (Euclidean) projection function onto X νi for i ∈ Iν and Πθ(·) the
projection function onto Xθ for θ ∈ Θ.
Let Πν denote the (Euclidean) projection function onto X νS(Aν) ⊂ LI
ν
S , and Π the projection function
onto X (A) ⊂ L2([0, 1],RT ;µ).
Since X νi ’s, Xθ’s, X (A) and X νS(Aν)’s (as defined by (8)) are all convex and closed in their respective
Hilbert spaces, the projection functions onto these sets are well defined.
The following Lemma 3.1 shows that the players become infinitesimal along a sequence of finite-type
approximating games.
Lemma 3.1. Under Assumption 1, for all ν ∈ N∗, ‖xν‖2 ≤ δν +R for all xν ∈ X νS.
Proof. Let xνi ∈ X νi and θ ∈ Θνi . By definition of δνi ,
∥∥xνi − Πθ(xνi )∥∥ ≤ δνi so that ‖xνi ‖ ≤ (δνi +∥∥Πθ(xνi )∥∥) ≤ (δνi + R). Then, ‖xν‖22 = ∑Iνi=1 ∫Θi ‖xνi ‖2 dθ = ∑Iνi=1 µνi ‖xνi ‖2 ≤ ∑Iνi=1 µνi (δνi + R)2 ≤
(δν +R)2.
The following lemma shows that the convergence of each type of action set in finite-type game Gν to
that of her corresponding nonatomic player in G, assumed by Eq. (11), implies the convergence of the
product action sets in L2([0, 1],M).
Lemma 3.2 (Convergence of X νS to X ). Under Assumption 1, for all ν ∈ N∗,
i) for each xν ∈ X νS, d2(xν ,X ) ≤ δ
ν ;
ii) for each x ∈ X , d2(ψν(x),X νS) ≤ δ
ν ;
iii) for each i ∈ Iν and each xνi ∈ X νi , if d(xνi , rbd X νi ) > δνi , then xνi ∈ Xθ for all θ ∈ Θνi ;
iv) for each i ∈ Iν , each θ ∈ Θνi , and each xθ ∈ Xθ, if d(xθ, rbd Xθ) > δνi , then xθ ∈ X νi .
Proof. i) Let xν ∈ X νS . For each i ∈ Iν and each θ ∈ Θνi , define yθ = Πθ(xν) ∈ Xθ, so that
‖yθ − xν‖ ≤ δνi . Let us show that y is measurable on each Θνi , hence measurable on Θ so that y ∈ X .
For that, define κi on Θνi ×MT by κi : (θ,w) 7→ ‖xνi −w‖. Then, κi is a Carathe´odory function. Since
the correspondence Θνi 3 θ 7→ Xθ is measurable, according to the measurable maximum theorem [1, Thm.
18.19], there is a measurable selection of xθ ∈ arg minXθ κi(θ, ·). The minimum of κi(θ, ·) on Xθ is unique
and is just yθ, hence y is measurable on Θνi .
Then, ‖xν − y‖2 ≤ δν , which shows that d2(xν ,X ) ≤ δν .
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ii) Let x ∈ X . For each i ∈ Iν , θ ∈ Θνi , ‖xθ − Πνi (xθ)‖ ≤ δνi . Since X νi is a convex subset in RT ,
1
µν
i
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ ∈ X νi . Define y ∈ X ν by yθ = yi , 1µν
i
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ ∈ X νi for each θ ∈ Θi, for i ∈ Iνi .
Then, from Cauchy-Schwartz inequality:
‖ψν(x)− y‖22 =
∑
i∈Iν
µνi ‖ψνi (x)−
1
µνi
∫
Θν
i
Πνi (xθ) dθ‖2 =
∑
i∈Iν
1
µν
i
‖ ∫Θν
i
(xθ −Πνi (xθ)) dθ‖2
≤
∑
i∈Iν
1
µνi
µνi
∫
Θi
‖xθ −Πνi (xθ)‖2 dθ =
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θi
‖xθ −Πνi (xθ)‖2 dθ ≤
∑
i∈Iν
µνi (δνi )2 ≤ (δ
ν)2,
so that ‖ψν(x)− y‖2 ≤ δν . This concludes the proof.
iii) Fix ν ∈ N∗, i ∈ Iν and θ ∈ Θνi . Consider xνi ∈ X νi such that d(xνi , rbd X νi ) > η for some
η > δνi . Assume that xνi /∈ Xθ i.e.
∥∥xνi − ΠXθ (xνi )∥∥ > 0. Let yνi = xνi + η xνi−ΠXθ (xνi )∥∥xν
i
−ΠXθ (xνi )
∥∥ ∈ X νi as
span Xθ ⊂ span X νi .
Since X νi is convex, d(yνi ,Xθ) =
∥∥xνi − ΠXθ (xνi )∥∥ + ∥∥yνi − xνi ∥∥ > η > δνi , which contradicts the fact
that d(Xθ,xνi ) ≤ δνi . Hence xνi ∈ Xθ.
iv) The proof is similar to that of iii).
Note that, because of the convexity assumptions (Assumption 1), the sets of aggregate action profiles
in the finite-type game Gν(Aν), obtained by considering symmetric or by considering non symmetric
profiles are the same, that is:
X ν ,
{∫
Θ xθ dθ |x ∈ X ν
}
=
{∫
Θ xθ dθ |x ∈ X νS
}
, (16)
and the same equality holds for X ν ∩Aν when considering aggregate constraint Aν .
The sequence of sets of aggregate action profiles (X ν)ν in games (Gν(Aν))ν with aggregative con-
straints, converges to the set of aggregate-action profiles of the nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with
an aggregative constraint, as the following lemma says.
Lemma 3.3. Under Assumption 1, for ν ∈ N∗,
i) dH(X ν ,X ) ≤ δν ;
ii) for X ∈ ri X , if d(X, rbd X ) > δν , then X ∈ X ν ;
for Xν ∈ ri X ν , if d(X, rbd X ν) > δν , then X ∈ X ;
iii) for X ∈ ri A, if d(X, rbd A) > Dν , then X ∈ Aν ;
for Xν ∈ ri Aν , if d(Xν , rbd Aν) > Dν , then Xν ∈ A;
iv) for X ∈ ri (X ∩A), if d(X, rbd (X ∩A)) > max(δν , Dν), then X ∈ X ν ∩Aν ;
for Xν ∈ ri (X ν ∩Aν), if d(Xν , rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) > max(δν , Dν), then Xν ∈ X ∩A.
Proof. i) Fix x ∈ X . Consider y ∈ X νS such that ‖ψν(x)−y‖2 ≤ δ
ν (cf. Lemma 3.2). Then, from Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, ‖ ∫ ψν(x)−∫ y‖2 ≤ ‖ψν(x)−y‖22 ≤ (δν)2. Hence d(∫ x,X ν) ≤ ‖ ∫ ψν(x)−∫ y‖ ≤ δν .
On the other hand, let xν ∈ X νS , thus Xν ,
∫
xν ∈ X ν . For each i ∈ Iν and each θ ∈ Θνi , define
yθ = Πθ
(
xνi
) ∈ Xθ, so that ‖xνθ − yθ‖ ≤ δνi . Then, ‖ ∫ xν − ∫ y‖ ≤ ∫ ‖xνθ − yθ‖dθ ≤ δν , which shows
that d
(
Xν ,X ) ≤ δν for all Xν ∈ X ν .
ii-iii) The proof is similar to that for Lemma 3.2.iii).
iv) These are corollaries of ii) and iii).
For the proof of the main theorem, we need to rely on nonatomic profiles that are away from the
boundary of the feasible domain, giving us some margin. The existence of such profiles is ensured by the
following lemma.
Lemma 3.4. Under Assumptions 1 and 5, there is a strictly positive constant ρ∗ and a nonatomic action
profile z ∈ X such that ∫ z ∈ ri (X ∩A) and, for almost all θ ∈ Θ, d(zθ, rbd Xθ) > 3ρ∗.
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Proof. Take x¯ the nonatomic action profile in Assumption 5 and an arbitrary y ∈ X (A) such that∫
y ∈ ri (X ∩A).
Denote t = d(
∫
y,rbd (X∩A))
3M . Define profile z ∈ X by z = y − t(y − x¯).
Firstly, ‖ ∫ y − ∫ z‖ = t‖ ∫ y − ∫ x¯‖ ≤ t2M ≤ 23d(∫ y, rbd (X ∩A)), hence ∫ z ∈ ri (X ∩A).
Besides, for any θ, zθ = yθ − t(yθ − x¯θ). Since d(x¯θ, rbd Xθ) > η, yθ ∈ Xθ, and Xθ is convex, one has
d(zθ, rbd Xθ) > ηt = η3M d(
∫
y, rbd (X ∩A)). One concludes by defining ρ∗ , η9M d(
∫
y, rbd (X ∩A)).
Notations. Denote Z =
∫
z where z is the one in Lemma 3.4 and define ρ¯ , 13d(Z, rbd X ∩A) > 0 and
the parameter ρ , min(ρ∗, ρ¯), appearing in the bounds of Theorem 3.1.
{x| ∫ x ∈ Aν}
X˜ νS
X˜ νS (Aν)
xν
zν
wν
2ρ∗
Xν
Z
W ν
2ρ¯
2tρ∫
=⇒
Aν
X ν
X ν ∩Aν
Figure 1: Illustration of the mapping
∫
Θ(.) between X
ν(Aν) and X ∩A used in Lemma 3.5
The following lemma shows that the space of symmetric action profiles in the finite-type game with
aggregative constraint, X νS(Aν), is converging to the space of action profiles in the nonatomic aggregative
game with aggregative constraint, X (A).
Lemma 3.5 (Convergence of X νS(Aν) to X (A)). Under Assumptions 1 and 5, let KA = R+1ρ . Then, for
all ν ∈ N∗ such that max(δν , Dν) < ρ,
i) for each xν ∈ X νS(Aν), d2(xν ,X (A)) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δ
ν);
ii) for each x ∈ X (A), d2(ψν(x),X νS(Aν)) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δ
ν).
Proof. i) Consider xν ∈ X νS(Aν) and Xν =
∫
xν . Let zν , ψν(z) where z is defined in Lemma 3.4.
Since for each θ, d(zθ, rbd Xθ) > 3ρ > δν , one has zν ∈ X νS according to Lemma 3.2.iv).
Define wν , xν + t(zν − xν) with t , max(Dν ,δ
ν)
ρ < 1, then wν ∈ X νS from convexity and:
• we have ‖wν − xν‖2 = max(Dν , δν)‖z
ν−xν‖2
ρ ≤ max(Dν , δ
ν) 2(R+1)ρ ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δ
ν);
• let us show that wν ∈ X : from Lemma 3.2.iii), it is sufficient to show that d(wνi , rbd X νi ) > δ
ν
i .
For that, we show d(zνi , rbd X νi ) ≥ 2ρ which implies d(wνi , rbd X νi ) ≥ 2tρ > δ
ν . For any arbitrary yi ∈
B2ρ(zνi )∩span X νi , let yθ , zθ+yi−zνi for θ ∈ Θνi . Then, yθ ∈ B2ρ(zθ)∩span Xθ as span Xθ = span X νi ,
and d(yθ, rbd Xθ) ≥ d(zθ, rbd Xθ)− ‖zθ − yθ‖ > 3ρ− 2ρ = ρ > δν . Hence, from Lemma 3.2.iv), one has
yθ ∈ X νi and, from convexity, yi = 1µν
i
∫
Θi yθ ∈ X νi which concludes;
• let us show that W ν =
∫
wν ∈ A: from Lemma 3.3.iii), it is sufficient to show that W ν ∈ ri Aν and
d(W ν , rbd Aν) > Dν . First, since max(δν , Dν) < ρ¯, one has d(Z, rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) ≥ 3ρ¯−max(δν , Dν) ≥
2ρ¯. The linear mapping x 7→ ∫ x maps the segment linking xν and zν in X ν(Aν) to a segment linking
Xν and Z = Zν in X ν ∩ Aν . Hence, by the definition of wν , B2tρ(W ν) ∩ span (X ν ∩ Aν) ⊂ X ν ∩ Aν ,
because each point in B2tρ(W ν) ∩ span (X ν ∩ Aν) is on the segment linking Xν and some point in
B2ρ(Z)∩ span (X ν ∩Aν) ⊂ X ν ∩Aν . We conclude with d(W ν , rbd (X ν ∩Aν)) ≥ 2tρ = 2 max(Dν , δν) >
Dν .
ii) The proof is similar and omitted.
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X˜ νS (Aν)
X˜ (A)
x2
x1
X ν1
X˜ νS
X ν2
X˜
{x| ∫ x∈A}
{x| ∫ x∈Aν}
xν ΠX˜ (x
ν)
Π(xν)
Figure 2: Difference between projections on X and on X (A). (Since it is impossible to draw the graph of a L2 action-profile
space with a continuum of players, we illustrate the idea with two players.)
Remark 3.3 (Difference between unilateral projections of actions and collective projection of the ac-
tion profile). Lemma 3.5 shows that d2(xν ,Π(xν)) ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δν) and d2(ψν(x),Πν(ψν(x))) ≤
2KA max(Dν , δ
ν), with Π and Πν the projection functions onto X (A) and X ν(Aν). Lemma 3.5 is of
first importance for our proof of Theorem 3.1: without it, we only have the convergence of individual,
i.e. unilateral action spaces in the sequence of approximating games, to the unilateral action spaces in
the nonatomic aggregative game, as shown in Lemma 3.2. Without coupling constraints, this should be
sufficient in the proof of the convergence of a sequence of SVWE. However, in the presence of coupling
aggregative constraints, this convergence of unilateral action spaces is not enough. Given a profile in
X νS(Aν), unilateral projection of each type i player’s action onto the corresponding nonatomic player’s
action space in G(A), i.e. from X νi to Xθ, cannot guarantee that the resulting action profile is in X (A),
and vice versa. Lemma 3.5 shows that, for each action profile xν ∈ X νS(Aν), its projection on the space
of nonatomic action profiles in X (A) is close to xν , and vice versa.
We are finally ready to prove Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Fix ν ∈ N∗, define zˆν , Π(xˆν) ∈ L2([0, 1],RT ). Then zˆν ∈ X (A) is an ac-
tion profile in nonatomic aggregative game G(A). By the definition of VWE (Definition 2.4), we have∫ 1
0 〈gx∗(θ), x∗θ − zˆνθ 〉dθ ≤ 0.
Secondly, by the definition of SVWE, we have
∫ 1
0 〈hxˆν (θ), xˆνθ − zνθ 〉dθ ≤ 0 for any zν ∈ X ν(A),
where hxˆν (θ) = ∇1fνθ (xˆνθ ,Xν) = ∇1fνi (xˆνi ,Xν) , hxˆν (i), for each θ ∈ Θνi and each type i ∈ Iν .
For all i ∈ Iν and θ ∈ Θνi , by the definition of dνi (cf. Eq. (12)), we have ‖hxˆν − gxˆν‖2 ≤ dνi .
Thirdly, ‖xˆν − zˆν‖2 ≤ 2KA max(Dν , δν) by Lemma 3.5.
With these two results, while noticing that xˆνθ ≤ R+ δ
ν for all θ by Lemma 3.1, one has:∫
Θ
〈
gx∗(θ)− gxˆν (θ), x∗θ − xˆνθ
〉
dθ
=
∫
Θ
〈gx∗(θ), x∗θ − zˆνθ 〉 dθ +
∫
Θ
〈gx∗(θ), zˆνθ − xˆνθ 〉 dθ
+
∫
Θ
〈
gxˆν (θ)− hxˆν (θ), xˆνθ − x∗θ
〉
dθ +
∫
Θ
〈
hxˆν (θ), xˆνθ−x∗θ
〉
dθ
≤ 0+ ‖gx∗‖2 ‖zˆ−xˆν‖2+ ‖gxˆν − hxˆν‖2 ‖xˆν − x∗‖2 +Jν
≤ 2Lf KA max(Dν , δν) + (2M + δν)dν + Jν (17)
where Jν ,
∫
Θ
〈
hxˆν (θ), xˆνθ−x∗θ
〉
dθ =
∑
i∈Iν
∫
Θν
i
〈
hxˆν (i), xˆνθ − x∗θ
〉
dθ.
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Next, for the VWE x∗ ∈ X (A), let y∗ν = ψ(x∗) ∈ L2([0, 1],M) and z∗ν , Πν(y∗ν) ∈ X ν(Aν):
Jν =
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hxˆν (i),
∫
Θν
i
xˆνθ − x∗θ dθ
〉
=
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hxˆν (i), µνi (xˆνi − y∗νi )
〉
(18)
=
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hxˆν (i), µνi (xˆνi − z∗νi )
〉
+
∑
i∈Iν
〈
hxˆν (i), µνi (z∗
ν
i − y∗νi )
〉
(19)
≤ 0 + (Lf + dν) ‖z∗ν − y∗ν‖2 ≤ (Lf + d
ν)2KA max(Dν , δ
ν) , (20)
because of the definition of SVWE xˆν and Proposition 2.2, the definition of dν and Lemma 3.5.(i).
Let us summarize by combining (17) and (20), and considering ν large enough such that dν , δν ≤ 1:∫
Θ
〈
gx∗(θ)− hxˆν (θ),x∗θ − xˆνθ
〉
dθ ≤ Ων with Ων , (4Lf + 1)KA max(Dν , δν) + (2M + 1)dν . (21)
Last, using the monotonicity definitions (Definition 2.3):
• if G is strongly monotone with modulus α, then α ‖xˆν − x∗‖22 ≤ Ων ;
• if G is aggregatively strongly monotone with modulus β, then β‖Xˆν −X∗‖2 ≤ Ων ,
which lead to the results announced in Theorem 3.1.
Remark 3.4. The strong monotonicity of the nonatomic aggregative game G, either with respect to
action profile or with respect to aggregate-action profile, is essential in this result. In contrast to finite-
player games (cf. [42]), strict monotonicity is not enough to obtain such results using the same techniques.
Indeed, since L2([0, 1],MT ) is only weakly compact, one cannot ensure that ∫Θ〈gx∗(θ) − hxˆν (θ),x∗θ −
xˆνθ 〉dθ tends to
∫
Θ〈gx∗(θ)− hzˆ(θ),x∗θ − zˆθ〉dθ in (21), where zˆ is an accumulation point of (xˆν)ν in the
weak topology.
3.3. Construction of a sequence of finite-type approximating games
As seen in our previous results, a nonatomic player θ is characterized by two elements: her action set
Xθ, and her gradient ∇1fθ defined from M2 to RT : (x,Y ) 7→ ∇1fθ(x,Y ).
Note that it is the gradient of the cost function ∇1fθ, instead of the cost function fθ itself, that
characterizes a nonatomic player’s type. For example, two players θ and ξ with Xθ = Xξ and fθ(x,Y ) ≡
fξ(x,Y ) + C where C is a strictly positive constant can be seen as identical in their behavior.
This section presents the construction of a sequence of finite-type approximating games for a given
nonatomic aggregative game G in two particular cases: 1) the player characteristic profile θ 7→ (Xθ,∇1fθ)
is piecewise continuous (cf. Definition 3.2) and, 2) {Xθ, θ ∈ Θ} and {fθ, θ ∈ Θ} are respectively polytopes
and functions parameterized by a finite number of real parameters. Those two cases are fairly general.
As illustrated in Section 4, they emerge naturally when the nonatomic game comes from the modeling
of a population described by parametric probability distributions, the main motivation for considering
infinite nonatomic games.
Case 1: Piecewise Continuous Characteristics – Uniform Splitting.
Definition 3.2 (Continuity of nonatomic player characteristic profile). The player characteristic profile
θ 7→ (Xθ,∇1fθ) in nonatomic aggregative game G is continuous at θ ∈ Θ if, for all ε > 0, there exists
η > 0 such that: for each θ′ ∈ Θ
|θ − θ′| ≤ η ⇒
{
dH(Xθ,Xθ′) ≤ ε
sup(x,Y )∈M×M ‖∇1fθ(x,Y )−∇1fθ′(x,Y )‖ ≤ ε .
(22)
If (22) is true for all θ and θ′ on an interval Θ′ ⊂ Θ, then the player characteristic profile is uniformly
continuous on Θ′.
Assume that the player characteristic profile θ 7→ (Xθ,∇1fθ) of nonatomic aggregative game G is
piecewise continuous, with a finite number K of discontinuity points σ0 = 0 ≤ σ1 < σ2 < · · · < σK ≤
σK = 1, and that it is uniformly continuous on (σk, σk+1), for each k ∈ {0, . . . ,K − 1}.
For ν ∈ N∗, define an ordered set of Iν cutting points by {υνi , i = 0, . . . , Iν} :=
{
k
ν
}
0≤k≤ν∪{σk}1≤k≤K
and the corresponding partition (Θνi )i∈Iν of Θ by:
Θνi = [υνi−1, υνi ) for i ∈ {1, . . . , Iν − 1} ; ΘνIν = [υνIν−1, 1].
Hence, µνi = υνi − υνi−1. Denote υ¯νi = υ
ν
i−1+υ
ν
i
2 .
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Proposition 3.1. Let Assumptions 1 to 4 hold, and assume that {span Xθ}θ∈Θ has a finite number of
elements. For ν ∈ N∗, consider the finite-type game Gν(Aν) with aggregative constraint Aν , A, set of
types Iν , {1 . . . Iν}, where for each type i ∈ Iν :
X νi , Xυ¯νi and fνi (x,Y ) , fυ¯νi
(
x,Y
)
, ∀(x,Y ) ∈M×M.
Then
(
Gν(A)
)
ν
=
(Iν ,X ν , A, (fνi )i∈Iν)ν is a sequence of finite-type approximating games of nonatomic
aggregative game G(A).
Proof. Let us show the three points required by Definition 3.1 as follows.
i) Given an arbitrary ε > 0, there is a common modulus of uniform continuity η such that (22) holds
for all the intervals (σk, σk+1). For ν large enough, one has, for each i ∈ Iν , µνi < η so that for all θ ∈ Θνi ,
|υ¯νi − θ| < η; hence dH
(Xθ,X νi ) = dH(Xθ,Xυ¯νi ) < ε.
ii) According to the continuity property, for all (x,Y ) ∈M2:
‖∇1fνi (µνi x,Y ) − ∇1fθ(x,Y )‖ =
∥∥∥∇1fυ¯ν
i
(
x,Y
)
− ∇1fθ(x,Y )
∥∥∥ < ε.
To be rigorous, one would we need to ensurespan Xθ to be the same for all θ ∈ Θνi : if not, one can
further divide Θνi into a finite number groups so that players in each group have the same span Xθ. This
is possible because {span Xθ}θ is finite.
iii) By definition, Dν = 0.
Case 2: Finite-dimensions Parameterized Characteristics – Meshgrid Approximation.
Assume that the nonatomic aggregative game G satisfy two conditions:
(i) The feasible action sets are K-dimensional polytopes: there exists a constant real-valued K × T
matrix P , and a bounded mapping b : Θ → RK , such that for any θ, Xθ = {x ∈ RT : Px ≤ bθ}, which
is a nonempty, bounded, closed and convex polytope in RT .
(ii) There is a bounded mapping s : Θ → Rl such that for any θ ∈ Θ, fθ(·, ·) = f(·, · ; sθ). Further-
more, for all (x,Y ) ∈ M2, ∇1f(x,Y ; ·) is Lipschitz-continuous in s and with a Lipschitz constant L3,
independent of x and Y .
Denote bk = minθ bθ,k, bk = maxθ bθ,k for k ∈ {1 . . .K} and sk = minθ sθ,k, sk = maxθ sθ,k for k ∈
{1 . . . l}. The characteristics of player θ are parameterized by point (bθ, sθ) in
∏K
k=1[bk, bk]×
∏l
k=1[sk, sk],
a compact subset of RK+l.
Fix ν ∈ N∗, consider a uniform partition of the compact set ∏Kk=1[bk, bk] ×∏lk=1[sk, sk], obtained
by dividing each dimension of this compact set into ν equal parts. Hence, the partition is composed
of Iν , νK+l equal-sized subsets of
∏K
k=1[bk, bk] ×
∏l
k=1[sk, sk]. The cutting points of the partition
are bk,nk , bk +
nk
ν (bk − bk) for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K}, and sk,nk , sk + nkν (sk − sk) for k ∈ {1, . . . , l}, with
nk ∈ {0, . . . , ν}. Let the set of vectorial indices, indexing the partition, be denoted by:
Γν , {n = (nk)K+lk=1 ∈ NK+l |nk ∈ {1, . . . , ν}} .
Define the corresponding partition of the interval Θ: Θ =
⋃˙
n∈ΓνΘνn, where:
Θνn ,
{
θ ∈ Θ : bθ,k ∈ [bk,nk−1, bk,nk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ K; sθ,k ∈ [sk,nk−1, sk,nk) for 1 ≤ k ≤ l
}
.
To be rigorous, when bk,nk = bk or sk,nk = sk, the parameter interval is closed at the right.
Finally, define the set of players Iν as the elements n in Γν such that µ(Θνn) > 0.
Proposition 3.2. For ν ∈ N∗, let the nonatomic finite-type game Gν(Aν) with an aggregative constraint
Aν , A, set of types Iν , {n ∈ Γν : µ(Θνn) > 0} and, for each type n ∈ Iν ,
X νn , {x ∈ RT |Px ≤
∫
Θνn
bθ dθ} ,
fνn(x,Y ) , µνnf
( 1
µνn
x,Y ; 1µνn
∫
Θνn
sθ dθ
)
, ∀(x,Y ) ∈ µνiM×M.
Then, under Assumptions 1 to 4, (Gν(A))ν =
(Iν ,X ν , A, (fνi )i∈Iν)ν is a sequence of finite-type approx-
imating games of the nonatomic aggregative game G(A) with an aggregative constraint.
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Proof. Let us show the three properties required by Definition 3.1 as follows.
i) For each n ∈ Iν , X νn =
{
x ∈ RT : Px ≤ 1µνn
∫
Θνn
bθ dθ
}
. Then, by a result generalized from [7,
Thm. 4.1], there is a constant C0 such that, for each θ′ ∈ Θνn: dH (Xθ′ ,X νn) ≤ C0
∥∥∥bθ′ − 1µνn ∫Θνn bθ dθ∥∥∥ ≤
C0
ν
∥∥b− b∥∥. Hence, δν tends to 0. Note that in this case, the assumption of {span Xθ}θ∈Θ being finite is
naturally satisfied.
ii) For each n ∈ Iν and each θ′ ∈ Θνn, for all (x,Y ) ∈M2, one has:
‖∇1fνn(x,Y ) − ∇1fθ′(x,Y )‖ =
∥∥∥∇1f(x,Y ; 1µνn ∫Θνn sθ dθ) − ∇1f(x,Y ; sθ′)∥∥∥
≤ L3‖ 1
µνn
∫
Θνn
sθ dθ − sθ′‖ ≤ L3
ν
‖s− s‖ ,
by the Lipschitz continuity of ∇1f(x,Y ; ·). Hence, dν tends to 0.
iii) By definition, Dν = 0.
Remark 3.5. In Proposition 3.2, instead of the average value of the characteristics of nonatomic players
on Θνn, one can use the characteristic value of any nonatomic player in Θνn.
Remark 3.6. By construction, in both sequences above, the compacity and convexity of the feasibility
sets (Xi)i and the convexity and continuity of cost functions (fi)i are naturally inherited from the proper-
ties assumed on (Xθ)θ and (fθ)θ. This should often be the case when building a sequence of approximating
games from a nonatomic game with an infinity of types.
4. Illustration on a Smart Grid Example
In this section the results are derived on a simple example for illustration, in the framework stated
in introduction. In this example, we will be able to compute explicitly the aggregate equilibrium of the
infinite-type nonatomic game.
We suppose that the energy operator has access to the probability distribution of the amount of
flexible energy in the N = 30 millions French households: let us assume that this distribution is uniform
on [0, Emax] with Emax = 20kWh (kiloWatthour), that is φE(E) = 1Emax for E ∈ [0, Emax].
Then the quantile function (or inverse cumulative distribution function), scaled by the population
size, is given by Eθ = F−1E (θ) = θEmaxN , for each θ ∈ Θ = [0, 1]. In this case, the action set mapping
X. : Θ⇒ R2 is given by:
∀θ ∈ Θ, Xθ =
{
xθ = (xθ,O, xθ,P ) ∈ R2+ | xθ,O + xθ,P = Eθ
}
,
which gives an infinity of different action sets. Let us consider, as said in the introduction, that there are
two prices:
cO(X) =
aO
N
XO and cP (X) =
aP
N
XP
for off peak and on peak periods, with aP > aO, that depend only the aggregate energy on off peak period
XO and on peak period XP (or rather on the average energy that consumers ask on these periods). Thus,
the cost function of each player θ is given, as in the example of public products game given by (6):
∀xθ ∈ Xθ, fθ(xθ) = xθ,O × cO(X) + xθ,P × cP (X) = 〈xθ, c(X)〉,
where c = (c0, cP ). Hence, all players have the same cost function: the infinite number of types is only
due to the infinite number of different action sets.
Owing to to Proposition 2.1, the nonatomic game G obtained is aggregatively strongly monotone with
modulus β = aON . However, the game is not strongly monotone.
It turns out that on this toy example, one can directly compute the aggregate profile of the VWE, as
the IDVI of Definition 2.4 asks to find x∗ ∈ X such that:∫
Θ
〈gx∗(θ),xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X
⇐⇒
∫
Θ
〈c(X∗),xθ − x∗θ〉dθ ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X
⇐⇒ 〈c(X∗),X −X∗〉 ≥ 0, ∀X ∈ X . (23)
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This simplification holds because, for each θ, gx∗(θ) depends only on the aggregate X∗ (which would not
be the case for general nonlinear cost functions). As a result the VI obtained is of finite dimension.
In this example, the aggregate action set X can also be characterized easily, although this would not
be the case for arbitrary sets (Xθ)θ. In fact, as the aggregate flexible energy available is Etot ,
∫
ΘEθ dθ =
1
2NEmax, we obtain:
X = {(XO, XP ) ∈ R2+ | XO +XP = Etot} . (24)
Indeed, if XO + XP = Etot, then taking xθ = X EθEtot , we have x ∈ X and
∫
Θ xθ dθ = X. The converse
inclusion is clear. Consequently, we obtain from (23) that X∗ is the solution of the quadratic program:
min
X
aO
N × 12X2O + aPN × 12X2P
XO +XP = Etot
0 ≤ XO, XP
that is: X∗ = (X∗O, X∗P ) = ( aPaO+aP Etot,
aO
aO+aP Etot).
Now, let us define a sequence of finite-type approximating games Gν to approximate G, with for each
ν ∈ N∗, Iν = ν. Let us drop the index ν for simplicity in the remaining. Let us split up the population
uniformly with Θνi = [ i−1I ,
i
I ], for each i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}.
Because of the linearity of θ 7→ Eθ, considering the uniform approximation detailed in Section 3.3
case 1, one will obtain directly X∗. For the example, let us rather consider the approximating games
defined with, for each i ∈ I:
Xi , {xi ∈ R2+ | xi,O + xi,P = Ei , iINEmax} . (25)
Besides, we naturally take fi , fθ for each i (as the cost function is the same for each player).
One can observe that we get for each i, δi = NEmaxI =
2Etot
I → 0, and of course di = 0.
On the other hand, computing the aggregate approximate equilibrium, similarly to (23), one obtains:
XˆI =
(
aP
aO+aP Etot(1 +
1
I ),
aO
aO+aP Etot(1 +
1
I )
)
= (1 + 1I )X
∗ ,
and thus we have:
‖XˆI −X∗‖ = ‖X
∗‖
I
=
√
a2O + a2P
aO + aP
Etot × 1
I
. (26)
However, from Theorem 3.1, as we can compute Lf = maxX∈X ‖c(X)‖ = aPN Etot, we obtain the more
conservative convergence bound (we can replace (4Lf + 1) by 2Lf since Dν = d
ν = 0):
‖XˆI −X∗‖2 ≤ 1
β
2Lf δ
I = N
aO
2aP
N
Etot × 2Etot
I
⇐⇒ ‖XˆI −X∗‖ ≤ 2Etot
√
aP
aO
× 1√
I
.
5. Conclusion
Theorem 3.1 provides a precise theoretical result for the use of symmetric, finite-dimensional, (vari-
ational) Wardrop equilibria (S(V)WE) as an approximation of the (V)WE in a strongly monotone or
aggregatively strongly monotone nonatomic aggregative game with an infinity of players types, with or
without aggregative constraints. There are numerous research themes related to this result and our topic
in general.
First, one needs to find efficient algorithms for the computation of finite dimensional variational
inequalities arising as the characterization of SVWE. An extensive literature exists in this regard but
our particular case of aggregative game with aggregative constraints may lead to special methods or
improvements on existing results [16].
Then, the extension of evolutionary dynamics for population games and the related algorithms, to the
framework of nonatomic games with infinitely many classes of players can be non trivial. A recent work
[17] proposes online learning methods for population games with heterogeneous convex action sets. The
presence of aggregate constraints adds two additional difficulties for considering evolutionary dynamics
in population games, as those dynamics are based on unilateral adaptations from players. On the one
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hand, in the presence of coupling constraints, unilateral deviations by players may well lead to an action
profile violating the coupling constraint. On the other hand, a feasible deviation in the action profile
cannot always be decomposed into unilateral deviations of players.
Last, our results are limited to monotone games and the convergence result is limited to strongly
monotone games. The study of nonatomic aggregative games that are not monotone needs probably
other approaches. Indeed, even for population games where there are only finitely many types of players,
there exist much fewer results for games that are not linear, potential or monotone. The question of
whether or not it is possible to obtain similar convergence results as those stated in Theorem 3.1 without
monotonicity assumptions constitutes an interesting path for future work.
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Appendix A. Extension of results to the subdifferentiable case
In this section, we explain briefly how our results extend to the case of convex nonsmooth cost
functions, considering subdifferential instead of gradients of convex costs.
The essence of the proofs are roughly the same as in the smooth case, but considering subdifferentials
requires some additional technical arguments. The full proofs can be found in [23]. The authors decided
to formulate the results in the smooth case so that the key arguments and ideas appear clearly.
Recall that the subdifferential, i.e. set of subgradients of a convex function f at x ∈ RT in its domain
C, which is a convex set in RT , is denoted by ∂f(x). Recall that g ∈ RT is a subgradient of f at x,
denoted g ∈ ∂f(x), iff for all z ∈ C, f(z) ≥ f(x) + 〈g, z − x〉.
One has to consider the correspondence of subdifferential H : L2([0, 1],M) ⇒ L2([0, 1],RT ), which
associate to each profile x ∈ L2([0, 1],M) and each player θ the set of subgradients of her cost functions:
H(x) , {g = (gθ)θ∈Θ | gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,
∫
x), ∀a.e.θ ∈ Θ} , ∀x ∈ L2([0, 1],M). (A.1)
In other words, H(x) is the collection of measurable (and integrable because of Assumption 3.iii adapted
to assume uniform boundedness of ∂1fθ ) selections of a subgradient for each xθ. Most of the paper can
be interpreted in the nonsmooth framework by
• replacing gx by an element of H(x) in the equations,
• considering the Hausdorff distance dH between subdifferentials instead of the Euclidean distance
between two gradients (e.g. for d in Definition 3.1 of a sequence of finite-type approximating games),
• a direct implication is that we have to consider generalized variational inequalities (GVI), finite
or infinite-dimensional, instead of VIs.
For instance, 〈gx∗ ,x∗ − x〉 ≤ 0,∀x ∈ X becomes ∃g ∈ H(x∗), 〈g,x∗ − x〉 ≤ 0,∀x ∈ X .
It is useful to introduce the best-reply correspondence Br : X ⇒ X :
Br(Y ) , {x ∈ X : xθ ∈ arg minXθ fθ(·,Y ),∀θ ∈ Θ}, ∀Y ∈ X ,
and, for Y ∈ X and x ∈ Br(Y ), the correspondence D(x,Y ): Θ→ RT defined by:
D(x,Y )(θ) , {gθ ∈ ∂1fθ(xθ,Y ) | 〈gθ, zθ − xθ〉 ≥ 0 , ∀zθ ∈ Xθ} ∀θ ∈ Θ
which is nonempty (by first order conditions) and closed-valued. To get similar results as in the smooth
case, we need to make the following additional assumption:
Assumption 6. For all Y ∈ X and all x ∈ Br(Y ), D(x,Y ) is a measurable correspondence.
One can show that H(.) and Br have nonempty values. Then, instead of Lemma 2.1, we use the
compact-valued selection theorem [6] to obtain for each x ∈ Br(Y ) the existence of a measurable mapping
θ 7→ gx(θ) such that ∀θ ∈ Θ,gx(θ) ∈ D(x,Y )(θ).
We can then obtain a characterization of WE similar to Theorem 2.1, where the differential gx∗ is
replaced by the existence of an element in H(x∗). The existence result in Theorem 2.2 is also valid in
the subdifferentiable case.
The monotonicity of G is defined as in Definition 2.3, where the inequalities on gx and gy now have to
hold for each pair of elements of the correspondences (gx,gy) ∈ H(x)×H(y). Properties characterizing
monotonicity given in Proposition 2.1 follow with essentially the same proof, having in mind that for any
θ, ∂1fθ(xθ,Y ) = {c(Y ) + g : g ∈ ∂(−uθ)(xθ)}.
In presence of coupling constraints, a VWE (Definition 2.4) is also defined by x∗ ∈ X (A) and the
existence of an element g ∈ H(x∗) satisfying the infinite dimensional GVI (7).
The existence of a VWE (similar to Theorem 2.3) can also be obtained in the nonsmooth case,
where the continuity of the gradient is replaced by upper-hemicontinuity of the correspondence H and
applying results of [13, Corollary 2.1]. The uniqueness conditions associated to monotonicity detailed in
Theorem 2.4 follow as well with essentially the same proof as for the smooth case.
The main result, Theorem 3.1, is obtained for the nonsmooth case with the same bounds on the
convergence rate.
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Appendix B. On the Relationship between Nash and Wardrop Equilibria
The objective of this paper is to approximate the equilibrium of a nonatomic game with an infinity
of players types, by considering approximating games with a finite number of players types.
A natural idea would also be to consider approximating games with a finite number of players, this
number of players growing to infinity to approximate the nonatomic population game.
Indeed, we briefly explain in this appendix how we can obtain similar convergence results by adopting
this approach considering finite-player atomic games. The approach is fully developed in [23].
The main difference and difficulty under this approach is that the equilibrium concept to consider
for finite-player games is no longer Wardrop Equilibrium, but Nash Equilibrium (NE). As the number
of players is finite, an individual action xi of a player i does have an impact on the aggregate action
X =
∑
i xi.
As a result, the modified cost function fˆi : (xi,X−i) 7→ fi(xi,X−i+xi) naturally appears, where the
action of i is taken into account in the aggregate action.
This modified cost function, and the impact of individual actions in general, have to be considered
both in the assumptions and in the definitions of the different concepts used in this paper.
Nash equilibrium are naturally characterized by finite-dimensional variational inequalities under con-
vexity hypotheses: in the atomic case, we need the additional following assumption:
Assumption 7. For an atomic game G(A) = (I, (fi)i, (Xi)i, A) with a finite set of players I and cost
functions (fi)i, the associated functions
(
fˆi(.,X)
)
i
are convex.
Note that this convexity is not necessarily implied by the convexity of fi(.,X). Under this additional
assumption, we obtain a GVI (where G stands for generalized in the nonsmooth case, see Appendix A)
characterization of NE, similar to the one for SVWE given in Proposition 2.2, and an existence result:
Definition Appendix B.1 (Variational Nash Equilibrium (VNE), [18]). A (variational) Nash equilib-
rium of atomic game G(A) is a solution to the following GVI problem:
Find xˆ ∈ X (A) s.t. ∃g ∈ H(xˆ) s.t. 〈g,x− xˆ〉 ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ X (A). (B.1)
where the subgradients correspondence H : X ⇒ RIT is given as:
∀x ∈ X , H(x) , {(gi)i∈I ∈ RIT : gi ∈ ∂1fˆi(xi,X−i), ∀i ∈ I} =
∏
i∈I
∂1fˆi(xi,X−i) .
In particular, if X ⊂ A, a VNE is a NE .
Proposition Appendix B.1 (Existence of VNE). Under Assumptions 1 and 3 (compacity and con-
vexity) on (Xi)i and Assumption 7, the atomic game G(A) = (I, (fi)i, (Xi)i, A) admits a VNE.
To obtain a convergence result of the (V)NEs in a sequence of atomic games, we need some stronger
properties than for the sequence of finite-type approximating games. In addition to Definition 3.1, we
assume that:
1. the number of players tends to infinity: Iν −→
ν→∞∞;
2. each player becomes infinitesimal: µi = µ(Θi) −→
ν→∞ 0 ;
3. in the gradient (or subdifferential) of a player, the impact of her own action on the aggregate profile
vanishes along the sequence, by considering the additional parameter (given in the subdifferential
case):
λνi , sup
(x,Y )∈M2
sup
g∈∂1fˆνi (µνi x,Y −µνi x)
d (g, ∂1fνi (µνi x,Y )) −→
ν→∞ 0 (B.2)
Then one obtains similar convergence result as Theorem 3.1, with the only difference being that:
• in the upper bound, dν is replaced by (dν + λν), where λν , maxi λνi ),
• for the convergence in Λ2([0, 1],M), one has to consider a projection of the (V)NE on Λ2([0, 1],M),
where each θ ∈ Θi is associated to the action of i ∈ I.
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Note that this approach has also another interest, as the convergence theorem that we obtain in
this case can be interpreted in the reverse way: under the right assumptions, in a sequence of atomic
games converging (in the sense given by the definition of finite-type approximating games) to a nonatomic
aggregative game, the sequence of Nash equilibria converge to an equilibrium (the SVWE) of this limit
nonatomic game.
In some particular cases where the continuous SVWE can be computed explicitly as a function x :
Θ→M (for instance in the example derived in Section 4), this would give an approximation of a Nash
equilibrium in the atomic (reality) aggregative game, as the finite number of atomic players is very large.
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